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IRREVOCABLE CONSENT: ADOPTION
IRREVOCABILITY OF CONSENT To SURRENDER
OF A CHILD FOR ADOPTION: C.CL v. The Natural
Parents, 398 So. 2d 220 (Miss. 1981).
In May, 1981, the Mississippi Supreme Court handed down
a decision of first impression concerning the adoption of an in-
fant. The court held that the biological parents of an illegitimate
child were not entitled to revoke their consent to the surrender
of the child to an adoption agency. In reversing the lower court
decree granting adoption by the natural parents, the court
acknowledged both their rights as the child's natural parents and
the fact that they had married subsequent to the date of consent.'
In June, 1979, Jane Doe' learned that she was pregnant. At
this time she was 20 years old, a single working secretary and
bookkeeper who had completed two years of college and was living
with her parents. John Doe, the father, was 17 years old and a
senior in high school. Several times between June and August
John attempted to make marriage plans, but Jane remained ada-
mant in her desire to place the child for adoption. Prior to the
birth of the child, Jane talked frequently with a representative from
C. C. I.V concerning the adoption at the instigation of her mother.
Mrs. Coe, Jane's mother, had already informed Jane that if she
decided to keep the child she would have to move out of her
parents' home. Mrs. Coe also informed John that she thought adop-
tion was the best idea for all parties concerned.
The baby was born on February 12, 1980. Three days later,
John and Jane decided to get married and raise the child, but Jane
changed her mind the next day. February 20, eight days after the
child's birth, Jane executed the surrender documents which en-
trusted care of the child to C. C. I. and consent for its adoption."
John consented on February 26 by signing an identical surrender
document entitled "Adoption Placement Agreement" before a
notary public and in the presence of Jane's mother and aunt. On
February 27 John contacted an attorney who sent a letter to C.
C. I. to revoke the consent agreement executed by John Doe.'
In the original adoption petition, John acted alone. He asserted
that he had been coerced into signing the surrender instrument
1. C.C.I. and N. and Mrs. N. v. Natural Parents, 398 So. 2d 220, 226 (Miss. 1981).
2. Pursuant to Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 93-17-25, - 29, - 31 (1972), all litigants are identified
either by initials or fictitious names.
3. "C.C.I., a non-profit corporation, is a licensed maternity home and adoption agency pro-
viding foster care and related child services." C.C.L, 398 So. 2d at 222.
4. Pursuant to Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-9(1972), a parent is required to wait three days
after the child's birth before executing surrender of the child. Jane waited eight days.
5. C.C.L, 398 So. 2d at 221.
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by the undue influence of Jane, her mother and the adoption agency
representative.' In her response, Jane denied that any undue in-
fluence had been exerted to force John to consent to the surrender
of the child. Further, she stated "that the child's best interest would
be served by permitting its adoption, not by John, but by 'a
qualified couple'."7
John and Jane were married on April 5, 1980, and Jane
joined with John to revoke consent for adoption of their child.
C. C. I. had already placed the child with adoptive parents, the
N's, who filed a cross-petition for adoption. The lower court deter-
mined that custody of the child belonged to its natural parents
but was reversed by the Mississippi Supreme Court in a unanimous
decision giving permanent custody to the N's on the grounds that
the Doe's consent was irrevocable.8
HISTORICAL PROGRESSION OF ADOPTION
Although unknown at common law,9 adoption existed in the
earliest civilizations. Biblical reference" to the practice of adop-
tion reflects acceptance by the Hebrew and Egyptian cultures.
However, the Roman culture left detailed accounts of procedural
and substantive aspects embodied in civil law1" which served as
a foundation for American statutes.' " The original purpose for
adoption was to prevent the extinction of a family," but adoption
was generally regarded as the method for changing the relation-
ship between the adoptive parents and the adoptive child by ter-
minating the adoptee's ties with his natural family and vesting him
with the "rights, powers, duties, and liabilities of parents and
children."' Today, these statutes are also instrumental in benefiting
"children in need of a home and parental care.""
Common law adoption was quite different. Prior to civil enact-
ments, blood lineage or jus sanguinis prevailed. Foster parent
arrangements were used extensively to maintain the "continuity
6. Construing Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-9 (1972), the court noted that consent to surrender
is revocable only when signed as a result of fraud, duress, or undue influence. Id. at 226.
7. 1d. at 223.
8. Id. at 220.
9. Green v. Paul, 212 La. 337, 343-46, 31 So. 2d 819, 821 (1947); Mayfield v. Braund,
217 Miss. 514, 519, 64 So. 2d 713, 714-15 (1953); Eggleston v. Landrum, 210 Miss. 645, 651-52,
50 So. 2d 364, 366 (1951).
10. Exodus 2:10.
11. Green v. Paul, 212 La. 337, 343-46, 31 So. 2d 819, 821 (1947).
12. Id. at 343-46, 31 So. 2d at 821. See also State v. Yturria, 109 Tex. 220, 224-25, 204
S.W. 315, 316 (1918); Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. Rv.
743, 744 (1956).
13. M.L.H. v. Carroll, 343 S.W.2d 622, 625 (Mo. 1961).
14. W.R. Fairchild Construction Co. v. Owens, 224 So. 2d 571, 574 (1969), citing Miss.
CODE ANN. § 1269 (1942).
15. 1 C.J.S. Adoption of Persons § 5 (1972).
16. "The right of blood." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 775 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
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of the adoptee's family""'; however, an heir not related by blood
could not inherit from his adoptive family ."8 The practice of adop-
tion came slowly to the United States without precedence of
English common law. Earliest influences came from Spanish and
French law rooted in Texas and Louisiana where Roman civil law
was the established practice reported in early cases.1" "The rights
of adoption . . . " being ". . unknown to the common law of
England ... exists in this country ... only by virtue of statute.""
Mississippi Adoption Law
In 1846, Mississippi became the first state to enact an adop-
tion statute." Entitled "An Act giving Power to the Circuit Court
and Chancery Courts to Legitimating Bastard Children, Alter or
Change Names, and for Other Purposes" this statute articulated
the concept that the adoption proceeding would establish the
adoptee as equivalent in all rights to a blood relative.22 This trend
away from the English preference for blood lineage was recognized
and accepted in adoption statutes enacted by other states.
Adoption law provides uniformity in adoption procedure and
enumerates the basic rights accruing to a person who is legally
adopted. Early statutes acknowledged both the adoptee's ability
to inherit from his adoptive family23 and the legal change in his
name. There was no consideration of the personal desire or in-
terest of the child nor any criterion for ascertaining the person
best suited to raise the child. Eventually, three schools of thought
developed in the United States which broadened these early pro-
cedural statutes into a body of adoption law different from either
English common law or Roman civil law.
Parental Rights
Nineteenth century concepts of custodial rights were centered
on the parental rights premise.2" Primarily, this custodial right
17. Huard, supra note 12, at 745. See also M.L.H. v. Carroll, 343 S.W.2d 622, 625 (Mo.
1961).
18. 17 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND, § 1406 (2d ed. 1935) ("[Tlhe rights, liabilities, and
duties of parents are inalienable.")
19. Green, 212 La. 337, 343-46, 31 So. 2d 819, 821 (1947).
20. Eggleston v. Landrum, 210 Miss. 645, 652, 50 So. 2d 364, 366 (1951) (quoting 1 AM.
JUR. Adoption of Children § 4 (1936)).
21. 1846 Miss. LAWS ch. 35, art. 2.
22. Cf 17 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND §§ 1406-23 (2d ed. 1935) (adoption pertaining
to inheritance was not passed in England until 1926).
23. This was a qualified right. The 1880 Mississippi statute was interpreted as requiring the
adoption petition to set out specifically the benefits to be conferred. See Beaver v. Crump, 76
Miss. 34, 58-60, 23 So. 432, 433-34 (1898). See also Leonard v. Weston Lumber Co., 107 Miss.
345, 348, 65 So. 459, 460 (1914).
24. COMM. ON THE FAMILY, GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, NEW TRENDS
IN CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS (1980).
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was a property right in which the child was considered to be
something in the nature of a chattel.25 To adopt a child, one had
to first overcome the presumption that the child belonged with
his natural parents. Normally, in any contest between the natural
parents and a third party, the child was placed with the natural
parents. Interfamily disputes between the natural parents and col-
lateral relatives were resolved in the same manner.
A transformation began to occur in legislative enactments.
The welfare and rights of the parents and the child were embodied
and protected by the law. These two concepts were totally uni-
que to American law; Mississippi law encompassed them in the
statute of 1857.26 Thereafter, petitioners were required to obtain
the consent of the natural parents prior to the filing of the peti-
tion for adoption, and the child's consent was also required pro-
vided he was over 14 years of age. The statute then specifically
provided that an adoption would be decreed if "the interest and
welfare of such infant will be promoted by such adoption."27 Under
this statute, the judiciary recognized and sanctioned the concept
of promoting the welfare of the child. However, it did so in terms
of the parental rights doctrine. The opinion of Hibbette v. Baines8
upheld the natural father's rights to the custody of his children,
expressing the two theories as one. "[T]he presumption naturally
and legally is that he will love them most and care for them most
wisely . . . and that custody of a child by the natural parent or
parents . . . is best for the interest, not only of the parent and
child, but also of society.""
The inadequacies of early adoption law required major
substantive changes during the twentieth century. In 1938," the
Mississippi legislature began the first of three major revisions.
This resulted in the addition of four specific provisions. Prior
statutes had established the procedure for adoption and legitima-
tion of children and the recordation of these facts on the petition
and in the public records. The legislature changed this to eliminate
the requirement of noting on the petition that the "child or person
to be adopted is illegitimate.""' As a consequence, it was also un-
necessary to note the name or residence of the father. "For the
25. Katz, Foster Parents v. Agencies: The Best Interests of the Child Doctrine, 65 MICH.
L. REV. 145, 151 (1966-67).
26. 1857 Miss. LAWS ch. 41, art. 41.
27. Id.
28. 78 Miss. 695, 29 So. 80 (1900).
29. Id. at 703-04, 29 So. at 81.




purposes of this act, the father of an illegitimate child or person
shall not be deemed to be a parent."
3 2
Consent of the natural parents has been a requisite to adop-
tion in Mississippi since 1857." The parents were made parties
to the proceeding either by joining in the petition or by being sum-
moned as defendants. However, in Roberts v. Cochran,34 Justice
Anderson declared that "[a]lthough the father or mother may be
unfit to have custody of their child, under our statute it cannot
be adopted by another without the consent of both of them." This
gave parents an unlimited power to control the child's destiny.
Section 358 of the Mississippi Revised Code of 1938 resolved
this problem by stating for the first time that if the parents, sing-
ly or jointly, should object to the proposed adoption before the
final decree, then the child could not be adopted, unless "the parent
so objecting had abandoned and/or deserted such infant, or is men-
tally and/or morally unfit to rear and train it, in either [case] the
adoption may be decreed notwithstanding the objection of such
parents."36 This was the first appearance of such a statutory pro-
vision in Mississippi.
3 7
The 1938 Code revisions provided legislative guidelines in
a relatively small area of unregulated adoption law. Many defi-
ciencies remained. Despite the consensual requirement, there were
no procedural provisions for presenting the natural parents' con-
sent to the court. The statute merely required that the consent be
obtained. Nor was the spouse of the person adopting required to
consent to or participate in the petition. The potential for abuse
by an adopting family from fraudulently acquired or false con-
sent or the risk of placing a child in a home where only one parent
welcomed him required strict regulatory control. Further interest
in the welfare of the child supported the idea of taking notice of
the child's preference even though he was under fourteen years
of age.38
32. Id.
33. 1857 Miss. LAWS ch. 41, art. 41.
34. 177 Miss. 546, 171 So. 6 (1936).
35. Id. at 553, 171 So. at 7.
36. 1938 Miss. LAWS ch. 268, § 358. This burden of proof on the petitioner to prove the
inadequacy of the natural parents to rear the child was espoused nearly 40 years before the statute
in Hibbette v. Baines, 78 Miss. 695, 703, 29 So. 80, 81 (1900).
37. But cf. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-15-103(3) (Supp. 1981) (Termination of parental rights
absent voluntary consent is permissible on five specific grounds: desertion of the child; abuse
of the child; failure to make diligent efforts for the resumption of parental rights after surrender
of the child to a child care facility; behavior of the natural parents rendering the return of the
child impossible, i.e., alcoholism, drug addiction, severe mental illness, or extreme physical in-
capacitation; and an "extreme and deep seated antipathy by the child towards the parents." Id.
38. McFarlane, The Mississippi Law on Adoptions, 10 Miss. L. J. 239, 251 (1937-38).
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Although public and private child care facilities existed, they
were not regulated by statute nor were they endowed with the
ability and authority to consent to adoption. At best, agencies could
participate only as the guardian of a child. If a child was aban-
doned and his parents were unavailable to consent to adoption,
the child would remain in the foster care relationships until ma-
jority. The psychological impact upon the child of this instability
worked contrary to the promotion of the best interests of the child.
Additional inadequacies in the system of agency care included
the absence of any investigatory procedure for determining the
acceptability of prospective parents or for a trial period in which
the agency, child, and potential parents could be certain that the
placement was in the best interest of all parties."
Other problems existed in the recordation aspect of adoption.
After the court had decreed that the adoption be allowed, there
was no provision for notifying the local bureau of vital statistics
of the change in name and status of the child. Additionally, adop-
tion records were still open to the public. The potential for scan-
dal resulting from the availability of this personal information
necessitated confidentiality.' Finally, the right of a person adopted
to inherit from his new family had not been sanctioned by statutory
law. Therefore, it was still necessary to specifically provide for
this in the adoption petition. Absent such a provision, the court
at its discretion, could find evidence lacking for the child to in-
herit as a blood relative.
One of these inadequacies was corrected in the second revi-
sion of adoption law in the Code of 1942. "1 The parents were per-
mitted to execute a sworn written statement which authorized a
person other than the parents or a benevolent charitable or religious
organization to act in lieu of the natural parents in court pro-
ceedings to consent to the adoption of the child. 2 In this manner
it became possible for parents to completely surrender their rights
and interests in the child and to vest them exclusively in a child
care agency, severing the biological relationship.
The inclusion of the parental capacity to surrender a child
to an agency created a problem for the courts -how to resolve
the issue of whether consent for surrender is revocable or ir-
revocable. In the 1945 case of Wright v. Fitzgibbon," the
39. Id. at 249-52.
40. Id. at 252.
41. Miss. CODE ANN. § 1269 (1942).
42. Id.
43. 198 Miss. 471, 21 So. 2d 709 (1945).
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*Mississippi Supreme Court held that the appearance of Mrs.
Wright in contest of the proceedings and her objection to the adop-
tion had the effect of revoking her consent given five years earlier
in a written agreement signed by her and the two prospective
parents."
Mississippi judiciary and legislative opinion concurred on the
issue of revocability of consent. However, a conflict developed
in Mississippi law, as in many other jurisdictions, between the
traditional parental right doctrine and the progressing standard
of best interest of the child. As previously stated, the parental
right doctrine was premised upon the superior right of natural
parents to the custody of their children absent a showing of aban-
donment or mental or moral incapacity to raise the children.
However, courts were beginning to recognize that in certain situa-
tions it was not in the best interests of all of the parties that the
biological tie be accorded such preference.
Best Interest of the Child
The best interest of the child standard"5 is the second major
school of thought advocated in judicial opinions and legislative
enactments. Lying at its foundation is the concept of the
psychological parent-child relationship. Instead of accepting the
rebuttable presumption that the natural parents should be entitled
to custody of a child, the court will look to see who the child
regards as his "parent." Often, a child will have known only his
surrogate parent and will violently oppose attempts to place him
with his biological parents. The termination of this initial parent-
child relationship may damage the child's sense of continuity at
a vulnerable stage of life." To subject the child to more than one
change of parents will result in shallow emotional relationships
and a pervasive sense of insecurity. 7 Consequently the implica-
tion is that the child should be placed as soon after birth as possi-
ble and that relationship should be made permanent and inviolable.
For parents struggling with the decision to retain their child or
to surrender him for adoption, the desire to postpone the deci-
sion for a few months after birth may seem inconsequential. But
44. Id. at 471, 21 So. 2d at 709. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 1269-09 (1942) ("[N]o infant shall
be adopted to any person if either parent, after having been summoned to sign the petition for
adoption, shall appear and object thereto before the making of a decree for adoption.").
45. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, and A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD
(1973).
46. Id. at 31-40.
47. Id. at 33.
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for an infant, two months can be the difference between relating
to a person as a parent or as a stranger. 8
Rights of the Parent v. Best Interests of the Child
Mississippi Courts struggled with the parental right and best
interest of the child doctrines for ten years following the 1942
code revision but reached no conclusive decision. For eighty-five
years, statutory language had remained unchanged "that the in-
terest and welfare of the person sought to be adopted will be pro-
moted by the adoption . . .,, Case precedence did little to clarify
the ambiguity of the legislative language. The case of Hibbette
v. Baines"0 held that "the pole star is the best interest of the child" 1 ,
while twelve years later the supreme court relied upon the paren-
tal right doctrine to return two children to their natural mother's
care. 
5 2
Four cases were presented to the court prior to 1955 con-
cerning child placement. Of these, three relied on the best interest
of the child doctrine. 3 However, as Mayfield v. Braund4 reflects,
the court was not willing to dispense with the parental right
doctrine.
In January, 1955, the Mississippi legislature changed the pro-
visions of this statute in a recodification of the laws of Mississip-
pi. Section 1269 was repealed by present Mississippi Code An-
notated section 93-17-9 (1972) which reads in part:
Any person required to be a party to an adoption proceeding
by section 93-17-5 may execute the surrender of a child to
a home by sworn or acknowledged instrument which shall
include the following: the name of the child and the home,
that there is thereby vested in the home the exclusive custody,
care and control of such child; that all parental rights to such
child including the right of inheritance of the natural parents
and the child shall not be affected until entry of a final decree
of adoption; that the home is authorized to execute a con-
48. Id. at 40.
49. MIss. CODE ANN. § 358 (1930); 1910 Miss. LAWS ch. 185; MIss. CODE ANN. § 299
(1917); MISS. CODE ANN. § 492 (1892).
50. 78 Miss. 695, 29 So. 80 (1900).
51. Id. at 725, 29 So. at 89.
52. Kinnaird v. Lowry, 102 Miss. 557, 59 So. 843 (1912).
53. See generally Fowler v. Sutton, 222 Miss. 74, 75 So. 2d 438 (1954) (stepfather entitled
to adopt boy after mother's death despite grandparents' opposition); Mayfield v. Braund, 217 Miss.
514, 64 So. 2d 713 (1953) (best interest standard is activated only after determination that the
child has been abandoned); Eggleston v. Landrum, 210 Miss. 645, 50 So. 2d 364 (1951) (best
interest of the child was promoted by placing him with adoptive parents who follow the beliefs
of the Christian Science faith); Wright v. Fitzgibbons, 198 Miss. 471,21 So. 2d 709 (1945) (best
interest of abandoned child was to be adopted by its natural mother).
54. 217 Miss. 514, 64 So. 2d 713 (1953).
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sent to adoption as provided by this chapter and that pro-
cess in any adoption proceeding is waived; that such sur-
render shall be irrevocable and that such person will not,
in any manner, interfere with the custody of such child thus
vested in the home. Said instrument shall not be executed
until three (3) days after the birth of the child and shall ef-
fectually vest in the home all rights thus surrendered and
all powers thus created, with the rights and power to ex-
ecute the consent to adoption as required in this chapter
authorizing the court to vest in the child and the adopting
parent or parents the rights herein provided."5 (emphasis
added)
Notice the absence of language allowing revocation under cir-
cumstances 'of undue influence.
This extensive recodification resolved many of the problems
cited in the 1938 and 1942 codes. Spousal consent was now re-
quired 6 and procedural rules for the general presentation of con-
sent to the court were included.5 Protection of the child and
families were advanced by the addition of sections providing for
the investigation of potential parents 8 and trial periods 9 before
a final decree, notification of the local bureau of records for con-
cealment of records 0 and reissuance of new birth certificates"
and the definition of proper child care facilities."
III. Regardless of what the statute expressed on its face, the
court interpretation of Chapter Seventeen has added depth and
a personal interest to the law. Rather than accept either the parental
right doctrine or the best interest of the child standard, the court
chose a middle of the road approach to adoption and custody
disputes. The majority of the states, including Mississippi, leaves
the matter to the discretion of the court. "Revocability of the sur-
render of a child and consent for another to adopt a child is not
to be decided upon rigid or technical rules. Such a decision must
be made upon sound judicial discretion."" In this standard, then,
the court may draw upon both doctrines to render the most
equitable result.
55. MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-9 (1972).
56. Id. at § 93-17-3.
57. Id. at § 93-17-5.
58. Id. at § 93-17-11.
59. Id. at § 93-17-13.
60. Id. at §§ 93-17-25, - 29, - 31.
61. Id. at § 93-17-21.
62. Id. at § 93-17-9.
63. C.C.I. v. Natural Parents, 398 So. 2d 220, 226 (Miss. 1981). See J.C. v. Natural Parents,
417 So. 2d 529 (Miss. 1982).
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The most steadfast rule favored by the court holds that in a
contest between the natural parents and a third party, it is presumed
that the best interest of the child will be best served by allowing
him to remain with the natural parents.6' In several cases, custody
has been granted to the natural parents under less than ideal cir-
cumstances. It is not the court's responsibility to see all children
placed where they can be exposed to the greatest economic
benefits. Consequently, custody between the natural parents and
a child has been restored even though the mother was too im-
mature to provide perfect care," and where the natural father had
tried to kill the children's stepfather,66 and where the children's
natural mother was convicted in a military court of the death of
her husband.67
Conversely, under the best interest of the child standard, the
court has resolved that custody be denied to a natural father who
was given life sentence for murdering his wife, 8 and to the natural
parent unsuccessfully alleging undue influence.69
The three most recent cases decided within one year of the
C. C. L v. Natural Parents0 decision are Naveda1 which sup-
ports the best interest of the child standards while favoring the
natural parents, Brown v. Robinson 2 which falls most readily
under the parental rights doctrine, and In re Adoption of a Minor
Child J. C. and N. C. v. Natural Parents, Scott County Welfare
Department, D. E. S. and J. A. S. Intervenors" which espoused
the use of judicial discretion in determining the placement of the
child.
The Instant Case
Three contentions are made by the natural parents in their
argument: that Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-17-9 (c)
64. Naveda v. Ahumada, 381 So. 2d 147 (Miss. 1980); Rodgers v. Rodgers, 274 So. 2d
671 (Miss. 1980); Newman v. Samples, 203 So. 2d 65 (Miss. 1968); Ford v. Litton, 211 So.
2d 871 (Miss. 1968).
65. Cook v. Cook, 267 So. 2d 296 (Miss. 1972).
66. Yerber v. Dearman, 341 So. 2d 108 (Miss. 1977).
67. Brown v. Robinson, 402 So. 2d 354 (Miss. 1981). See also Hall v. Hall, 202 So. 2d
641 (Miss. 1967) (mental capacity of the natural mother allegedly insufficient for her to care for
her children); Schillereff v. Ademany, 240 Miss. 275, 127 So. 2d 392 (1961) (natural mother's
alleged adulterous life style).
68. Shoemake v. Davis, 216 So. 2d 420 (Miss. 1968).
69. Miques v. Fountain, 203 So. 2d 483 (Miss. 1967) (not cited as precedent in C.C.I. v.
Natural Parents, 398 So. 2d 220); see also Parish v. Stevens, 228 So. 2d 607 (Miss. 1969) (adop-
tion by grandparents was in the best interest of the child).
70. 386 So. 2d 220 (Miss. 1981).
71. Naveda v. Ahumada, 381 So. 2d 147 (Miss. 1980).
72. 401 So. 2d 354 (Miss. 1981).
73. 417 So. 2d 529 (Miss. 1982).
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(1972) is unconstitutional, that the consent was executed under
conditions of undue influence and duress, and that these grounds
constitute good cause to revoke the consent.7 '
The constitutional question results in part from the language
in Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-17-5 which states that
"[iln the case of a child born out of wedlock, the father shall not
be deemed to be a parent for the purpose of this chapter . . . ."'
Elsewhere the statute refers to the surrender of the child to a home
for adoption by "any person required to be a party to an adoption
proceeding by section 93-17-5."76 Recent decisions of the United
States Supreme Court have held that state statutes declaring that
a father has no rights in his child when it was born outside of
the marriage relationship are unconstitutional under the fourteenth
amendment as violative of the due process clause." However, the
Mississippi Supreme Court declined to determine the outcome of
this case upon the constitutionality of these provisions of the
Mississippi Code. Reversing the lower court the Supreme Court
stated that it did "not hold statutes unconstitutional when the deci-
sion may rest on other grounds.""'
Consent
Since 1955, the validity of parental consent to the surrender
of a child to a child care agency has been regulated by the following
language: "the home is authorized to execute a consent to adop-
tion . . . and . . . process in any adoption proceeding is
waived; that such surrender shall be irrevocable and that such
person will not, in any manner, interfere with the custody of such
child thus vested in the home."7 9 (emphasis added). The issue
before the Mississippi Supreme Court for the first time was
whether parental consent to the surrender of a child to a licensed
home is revocable on grounds of duress or undue influence.
Answering this query in the affirmative, the court held that
evidence of undue influence was insufficient to warrant revoca-
tion of the consent in this case.
Statutorily, such consent is irrevocable.8" Despite reluctance
74. C.C.I. v. Natural Parents, 398 So. 2d 220, 222-25 (Miss. 1981).
75. MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-5 (1972).
76. Id. at § 93-17-9.
77. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
78. C.C.I., 386 So. 2d at 222 (citing Kron v. Von Cleave, 339 So. 2d 559, 563 (Miss.
1976) ); but see John Doe and a Female Infant v. Attorney W., 410 So. 2d 1312 (Miss. 1982)
natural father's rights can be terminated pursuant to Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-15-103 (Supp. 1981).
79. MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-9 (1972).
80. Id.
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by the courts in other jurisdictions to allow natural parents to
withdraw their consent, statutes generally provide for one of three
options: absolute revocation prior to the final adoption decree;
revocation during a grace period or at the discretion of the court;
or, in the absence of fraud or duress, that consent is final and
irrevocable. Court rendered decisions have rejected attempts to
have consent revoked when the parents had been fully informed
of the legal consequences and had subsequently executed the sur-
render voluntarily after considerable deliberation.
In reaching its decision, the Mississippi Supreme Court turned
for guidance to Louisiana, a civil law jurisdiction containing a
similar statutory provision.81 The Supreme Court of Louisiana had
unequivocally determined that the "act of surrender executed by
both parents of a child to a licensed adoption agency ...is
irrevocable."82 Accepting that court's rationale, the Mississippi
Supreme Court held that under section 93-17-9, "revocation can
be allowed only where sufficient legal grounds are established
by clear and convincing testimony, and such evidence is lacking
here. Consent is not to be arbitrarily withdrawn. " "
Undue Influence
The question of whether agency and parental actions con-
stituted duress or undue influence in this case was also an issue
of first impression. In the absence of prior judicial opinion defin-
ing undue influence used in obtaining parental consent for adop-
tion, the judiciary relied on legal treatises, case decisions re-
solved on grounds other than adoption and upon extraterritorial
cases in order to formulate the requisite definition.8"
"Execution of the surrender documents . . . without the free
exercise of their own volition untainted by domination, threats
81. Any parent of a child, whether the child was born in wedlock or out of wedlock
and whether the parent is over or under 21 years of age, may surrender the per-
manent custody of his child to an agency for the purpose of having the child adopted
by appearing before a notary and two witnesses and declaring that all of his rights,
authority, and obligations, except those pertaining to property are transferred to
the agency. This authentic act shall be signed by the agency and shall constitute
a transfer of custody to the agency after which the agency shall act in lieu of the
parent in subsequent adoption proceedings. No surrender of the custody of a child
shall be valid unless it is executed according to the provisions of this part.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:402 (West 1973).
82. Golz v. Children's Bureau of New Orleans, Inc., 326 So. 2d 865 (La. 1976).
83. C.C.L, 386 So. 2d at 226 (citing CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 18.4 (1968).
84. Duress is any wrongful act or threat which overcomes the free will of a party. Generally
this definition is associated with threats of violence, imprisonment, or economic hardship. Con-
sent obtained through the use of duress renders a transaction voidable. J. CALAMARI AND J. PERILLO,
CONTRACTS §§ 9 - 2, - 3, - 8 (2d ed. 1977). Undue influence is generally defined as being that
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of coercion of another person""5 constitutes duress and undue in-
fluence in the acquisition of parental consent for adoption in
Mississippi. Four means of exercising such influence were
recognized in this decision: overpersuasion, ' threats of economic
detriment or promise of economic benefit," ' the invoking of ex-
treme family hostility both to the child and the mother,"' and un-
due moral persuasion.8
The burden of proof is placed with the party asserting the
exercise of undue influence in obtaining consent.° "Such a burden
of proof must be met by clear and convincing evidence" ac-
cording to the court, rejecting the lesser burden of a preponderance
of the evidence. Any presumption that undue influence had been
exercised prior to consent is rejected by the court since this defense
must be pleaded affirmatively to receive court recognition.
In the present decision, the court held that there was no
evidence of excessive influence or duress exercised against the
young parents. " John and subsequently Jane Doe asserted that
both the agency case worker and Mrs. Coe, Jane's mother, were
primarily responsible for the coercive acts. Throughout Jane's
pregnancy, the case worker pointed out the problems Jane would
face as an unwed mother. Also, each young mother contemplating
the surrender of a child underwent continual group therapy" with
other women seeking agency help, and she was informed of the
option to leave her child with the agency for no more than three
influence which controls "the mental operations of the one influenced by overcoming his power
of resistance and thus obliging him to adopt the will of another, thereby producing ... the per-
formance of some act [by the influenced person] which he otherwise could not have done." Four
elements comprise this doctrine: "(1) a person is subject to influence, (2) an opportunity to exert
undue influence, (3) a disposition to exert undue influence, and (4) a result indicating undue in-
fluence." In evaluating whether a person has been subject to undue influence the total factual situation
must be examined. 25 AM. JUR. 2D Duress and Influence § 36 (1966).
85. C.C.I. v. Natural Parents, 398 So. 2d 220, 225 (Miss. 1981) (citing Allen v. Volunteers
of America, 378 So. 2d 1030 (La. 1979)).
86. Sorentino v. Family and Children's Soc'y of Elizabeth, 72 N.J. 127, 367 A.2d 1168
(1976) (threats of harassment and litigation by agency officials against a sixteen-year-old unwed
mother).
87. Downs v. Wortman, 228 Ga. 315, 185 S.E.2d 387 (1971) (natural mother offered plane
fare in exchange for execution of the adoption agreement).
88. Allen v. Morgan, 75 Ga. App. 738, 44 S.E.2d 500 (1947) (family pressure emphasiz-
ing detrimental effect to social standing in the community). In re Adoption of Susko, 363 Pa.
78, 69 A.2d 132 (1949) (unwed mother accused of causing her mother's paralytic condition and
the death of her grandmother).
89. Huebert v. Marshall, 132 Ill. App. 2d 793, 270 N.E.2d 464 (1971).
90. C. C.., 398 So. 2d at 223 (citing 8 P.O.F. 2D Adoption-Undue Influence § 10 (1976)).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 225.
93. Interview with Linda Raff, Social Worker at Catholic Charities, Inc., in Jackson, Miss.
(October 28, 1981).
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weeks before she made her final decision. 94
Mrs. Coe's advice and actions during Jane's pregnancy,
although favoring surrender of the child, did not constitute un-
due influence. Jane was found to be a mature woman with several
years of college experience, holding a responsible job prior to
the pregnancy. In the court's opinion, "[s]he was well aware of
her options."" Additionally, both Jane's and John's testimony con-
tradicted their assertion that parental pressure was excessive or
coercive.9'
The Mississippi Supreme Court further stated that any sur-
render of a child is "not [expected to be] free from emotions, ten-
sions and inescapable anxieties . . No doubt almost any person
situated as they were would experience emotional trauma, but there
is no law to the effect that surrender of a child is valid only if
done without such distress. If such were the law almost any child
surrender and subsequent adoption decree would be attacked."97
Analysis
Consent is an indispensible requisite if the court is to render
a valid adoption decree. Usually the adoption procedure requires
two steps which are separate and distinct:98 the termination of the
natural parents legal rights and responsibilities, and the creation
of adoptive parents legal rights and responsibilities99 in which all
of the rights, powers, duties and obligations of the child vest in
the adoptive parents and relatives as if the child had been born
into the family." °
This consensual requirement is waived under five specific
circumstances in Mississippi. 1 ' In all other circumstances, that
consent must be voluntary. Generally, both parents must consent
when they are married and desire to surrender the child. However,
94. C.C.L, 398 So. 2d at 223.
95. Id.
96. Jane testified as follows:
Q.: Is it your testimony that your mother told you that you should put the baby up for
adoption?
A.: No, she didn't tell me that.
Id. at 225.
97. Id. at 224.
98. H. CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 5.3 at 304 (1974).
99. Id. at 275.
100. W.R. Fairchild Construction Co. v. Owens, 224 So. 2d 571, 574 (1969).
101. MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-15-103 (Supp. 1981). Cf. Doe v. Attorney W., 410 So. 2d
1312 (Miss. 1982) (termination of a father's parental rights under § 93-15-103); Reyer v. Har-
rison County Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 404 So. 2d 1023 (Miss. 1981) (insufficient evidence to compel
termination of parental rights). -
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when the child is illegitimate, the majority of state statutes re-
quires only the natural mother's consent.
The integrity of the parent-child relationship is protected by
the necessity for voluntary consent before a child may be sur-
rendered. A voluntary consent is the execution of a statutory con-
sent to adoption or a proceeding for the statutory relinquishment
of the child. Statutory and case law generally accept undue in-
fluence and duress as the sole reason for revoking parental con-
sent to surrender a child. "Legal consent to an adoption actually
does not exist when obtained by such means. " " However, this
adoption standard has a high burden of proof, and it is the duty
of the party advocating revocation to prove by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the consent was given involuntarily as the
result of this coercion."'
The view espoused by the supreme court in this case rests
on a solid foundation of statutory law and judicial opinions
throughout the nation. Finally, the vacillation exhibited by Jane
Doe in considering the possibility of marriage and her early op-
position to John's contest of the consent which subsequently turned
into support of her husband's actions reflected a lack of commit-
ment to the child's welfare that the court could not ignore. Even
without such conclusive evidence against returning the child to
its natural parents, section 93-17-9 supports such a decision by
rendering consent to the surrender of a child irrevocable. The fur-
ther opportunity provided by the court in allowing the Does to
establish "either fraud, duress or undue influence by clear and
convincing evidence "i ' as a means of avoiding their contractual
obligation, was ineffectual to sway the court.
Considering the four classes of actions which comprise the
Mississippi definition of undue influence, it is easy to see the
degree to which appellees failed to meet their burden of proof.
Overpersuasion has been held to include threats of harrassment
and litigation,"°5 while failure to apprise the natural mother of alter-
natives to surrender of a child has been denounced as undue moral
persuasion." Promises of plane fare home offered to the natural
mother if she will execute the surrender document constitute un-
due financial influence'o° but arrangements for the payment of
102. 2 AM. JUR. 2D Adoption § 78 (1966).
103. C.C.I. v. Natural Parents, 398 So. 2d 220, 223 (Miss. 1981).
104. Id. at 226.
105. Sorentino, 72 N.J. 127, 367 A.2d 1168 (1976).
106. Huebert v. Marshall, 270 N.E.2d 464 (M1. 1971).
107. Downs v. Wortman, 228 Ga. 315, 185 S.E.2d 387 (1971).
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prenatal expenses do not." These categories are not applicable
to the present fact situation. However, the facts did allow applica-
tion of the family hostility argument. The most compelling case
recounts the pregnancy of a seventeen year old girl which resulted
in members of her family leaving home and accusations that her
predicament had caused both her mother's stroke and the death
of her grandmother.'
Obviously, the pressure in the last case cited had reached the
level of forceful harrassment vitiating the mother's consent,
whereas the parental pressure in the present case merely constitutes
persuasion. Reaching this conclusion, the court did not assimilate
from other jurisdictions criterion which would distinguish each
category of undue influence. Consequently a large area of the law
is still unresolved and will have to wait on cases requiring specific
classification.
Despite the strength of its decision based on legal principles,
the court took one final step to fortify its position:
Strong policy reasons support such a holding. If a parent
is allowed an unrestricted right to challenge his act of sur-
render, uncertainty and confusion among adoption agencies
would undoubtedly result, making placement more difficult
[resulting in detriment] to the children involved as well as
to the public welfare. The statutory safeguards are themselves
sufficient to guard against a hastily made decision.110
The court does not elucidate this point any further in the text
of the case. It adds a new dimension to the case, however, by
drawing first on principles of contract law as a method of resolv-
ing the issue. Secondly, it reflects the importance which the court
affords to factors totally extraneous to the immediate issue before
it.
Conclusion
The unanimous decision by the Mississippi Supreme Court
holding that consent for the surrender of a child is irrevocable
is the correct decision. Its precedential value is reflected in three
ways. It interprets statutory provision 93-17-9 to encompass an
option of revocability if the high burden of proof can be met. This
burden is clearly defined providing guidelines to be adhered to
in lower courts. Finally, the court provides the necessary latitude
108. Hendrix v. Hunter, 99 Ga. App. 785, 110 S.E.2d 35 (1959).
109. In re Adoption of Susko, 363 Pa. 78, 69 A.2d 132 (1949).
110. C.C.I. v. Natural Parents, 398 So. 2d at 226.
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for decisions to be made "upon sound judicial discretion"'11 and
not by rigid technical rules.
A simple analysis of the facts of this case without delving
into legal principles reveals the logic behind the court's holding.
Primarily, Mississippi statute 93-17-9 prevents revocation of the
surrender agreement. The interpretive exception to this rule al-
lowed by the court through proof of duress or undue influence
could not support the lower court ruling since the appellees were
unable to sustain their burden of proof. The appellees negated
their own assertions by their own testimony. Jane's decisions to
relinquish the baby, then to carry and raise the child, then again
to relinquish with express disapproval of John as the parent, and
her final act of marrying John and joining his petition to regain
the child evinces instability contrary to the child's best interest.
Such vacillation was condemned in Golz v. Childrens Bureau of
New Orleans, Inc. ,' a case relied on by the Mississippi Supreme
Court in rendering its decision. Finally, the parents relied on case
precedence in their defense established under a repealed section
of the Mississippi Code."'
The court based its decision on established legal principles
capable of precedential value. The major premise behind the
unanimous decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court holding con-
sent for the surrender of the child irrevocable lies in contract law.
Language concerning revocation, duress and undue influence per-
vades the opinion as rationalization for the decision. The offer-
acceptance-consideration trilogy of contract law is met by the
adoption-surrender document. In consideration for placing the
child with acceptable adoptive parents," 4 the natural parents of-
fer to surrender their child to the child care agency.
Two additional factors support the court's decision. In the
court's language, "strong policy reasons support such a holding.""'
However, the court provides only an enigmatic example of such
a strong policy reason." 6 Secondly, the court concludes with a
11l. Id.
112. 326 So. 2d 865 (La. 1976). This dealt with indecisive parents also. The child spent
the first six months of life moving back and forth between the custody of the natural parents and
the temporary foster care of the Children's Bureau. The court finally upheld placement with adoptive
parents.
113. C.C.I. v. Natural Parents, 398 So. 2d 220, 225 (Miss. 1981).
114. The requirements of acceptable adoptive parents are stated in Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3
(1972).
115. C.C.I. v. Natural Parents, 398 So. 2d at 226.
116. "If a parent is allowed an unrestricted right to challenge his act of surrender, uncertain-
ty and confusion among adoption agencies would undoubtedly result, making placement more
difficult which would be detrimental to the children involved as well as the public welfare." Id.
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statement concerning the necessity for maintaining the integrity
of the law through its decision." 7 In this particular case, the holding
and these two factors receive mutual support from each other.
Placing the child with the adoptive parents supports the status and
reliability of child care agency action. It ensures conclusive and
inviolable adoptions which will encourage people to utilize this
procedure as opposed to private adoptions or blackmarket baby
sales.
Prior to the C. C.L v. Natural Parents decision, the court
relied on the principles of parental rights, best interest of the child,
statutory interpretation and their own judicial discretion in review-
ing each case individually to assess the welfare of the parties con-
cerned. In essence the opinions evidenced a humanistic approach
to a difficult legal question and a molding of legal principles to
aid in defining its parameters. However, the C. C.. decision marks
an attitudinal shift in the court's perspective of adoption cases.
The emphasis on the welfare of the child has been subrogated to
an emphasis on the contractual aspects of the surrender agree-
ment and its impact on society as opposed to the individual. In
this move toward contract law, policy reasons, and maintenance
of the integrity of the law, the court is moving closer towards
the mechanical formula that they denounced." 8
A metamorphosis from the best interest of the child standard
to contract law could be detrimental in the long run. An "act of
adoption creates a status rather than a contract relation."" 9 By
transforming the custody decision process into a mechanical
formula... the justices are acting to create the very situation they
renounced in their opinion. "Revocability of the surrender of a
child and consent for another to adopt a child is not to be decided
upon rigid or technical rules. Such a decision must be made upon
sound judicial discretion."' (emphasis added). As incapable of
concrete definition as the best interest of the child standard is,
it still supports both this decision and the court's desire to render
its custody decision based on "judicial discretion."'
The best interest of the child standard is adopted by advocates
in both the legal and mental health professions. The psycho-legal
117. C.C.I. v. Natural Parents, 398 So. 2d at 227.
118. Id. at 226.
119. Green v. Paul, 212 La. 337, 31 So. 2d 819, 821 (1947) (citing 2 C.J.S. Adoption of
Children § 1 at 367-68).





keystone lies in the best interest of the child standard expressed
in numerous Mississippi decisions beginning with Hibbette v.
Baines."3 Supporting this theory is a treatise often cited in case
decisions entitled The Best Interest of the Child. 1 4 As noted above
this is not a purely psychological theory but is inextricably tied
to the law of adoption and child custody determination.
The concept of doing what is best for the child and the necessi-
ty of the permanency of placement are the two important prin-
ciples espoused. In this case of first impression, it was in the best
interest of the child to be placed with the adoptive parents who
had consistently shown a desire for the child and a dedication to
care for him on a daily basis. With respect to permanency in the
placement of the child, not only was the integrity of the adoption
process maintained, but the best interest of the child was served
by leaving him with the people he had come to know as his parents.
The court as parens patriae had a duty to uphold the law to the
protection of the infant. Any other decision would have been a
failure to enforce this duty.
However, the court mentioned the best interest of the child
only once in its decision.12 This is inconsistent with prior
Mississippi case law"2 6 in which the court has gone to great lengths
to serve the best interest of the child. Similarly, the court failed
to take notice of applicable statutory language advocating the best
interest of the child standard.
Finally, the court's allusion to strong policy reasons and the
integrity of the law moves the court further from the interest of
the child whose destiny is to be determined by the court and closer
123. 78 Miss. 695, 29 So. 80 (1900).
124. See Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, supra note 45.
125. C.C.I. v. Natural Parents, 398 So. 2d 220, 226 (Miss. 1981).
126. See generally, Naveda v. Ahumada, 381 So. 2d 147, 149 (Miss. 1980) ("[Tjhe best
interest and welfare of the child is the controlling consideration."); Yarber v. Dearman, 341 So.
2d 108, 110 (Miss. 1977) ("The court has the power ... to determine what is best for the children
insofar as their custody is concerned."); Hall v. Hall, 202 So. 2d 641, 642 (Miss. 1967) ("[A]
trial judge ... whose very office dedicates him to doing that which is in the best interest of
children."); Schillereff v. Adamany, 240 Miss. 275, 278, 127 So. 2d 392, 393 (1961) ("IT]he
good of the child is the chief concern of the court."); Brown v. Brown, 237 Miss. 53, 58, 112
So. 2d 556, 558 (1959) ("The paramount consideration is the child's welfare."); Brunt v. Watkins,
223 Miss. 307, 312, 101 So. 2d 852, 855 (1958) ("It is universally recognized that adoption laws
have as their primary purpose the promotion of the welfare of the child."); Fowler v. Sutton,
222 Miss. 74, 76, 75 So. 2d 438, 439 (1954) ("[I1n adoption cases the test is whether the interest
and welfare of the child sought to be adopted would be best promoted by the adoption. In other
words, the criterion is the best interest of the child."); Mayfield v. Braund, 217 Miss. 514, 533,
64 So. 2d 713, 721 (1953) ("[lit will be for the real best interest of the child that it should be
and remain in the custody of the parents."); Eggleston v. Landrum, 210 Miss. 645,652, 50 So.
2d 364, 366 (1951) ("Where the statutes provide for the adoption, there is unanimous agreement
that the welfare of the child is the primary consideration."); Hibbette v. Baines, 78 Miss. 695,
725, 29 So. 80, 89 (1900) ("[Tlhe pole star is the best interest of the child.").
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to a mechanical formula of custody determination. In these
statements the court intimates the importance of maintaining the
status of the child care agency and the subrogation of the child's
welfare. Fortunately, in this case, the two concerns were not con-
traindicative. A recent case has been decided in which the court's
desire to maintain the integrity of the agency did not act in the
best interest of the child. The case of J. C. v. Natural Parents
concerned a dispute over the obligations and rights under a "Con-
tract for Designation of Foster Home." 17
Foster parents, J. C. and N. C., appealed a decree of the
Chancery Court dismissing their petition for adoption of a minor
child placed in their home pursuant to a foster home agreement.
The Scott County Welfare Department obtained temporary custody
of the minor child in question and seven other children after an
investigation into the home revealed parental negligence in the
care of these children.128 After a five day period of hospitaliza-
tion, the two month old infant was placed with the appellants.l"'
Prior to the temporary placement of the child, the Welfare
Department had obtained surrender of parental rights and con-
sent from both parents while they were incarcerated. After ob-
taining the consent, the Welfare Department attempted to move
the child to the prospective adoption home of the S's for perma-
nent placement. At this point, the foster parents filed a petition
for adoption." 0
In reaching its opinion disallowing adoption by the C's, the
chancellor relied on the contract between the Welfare Department
and the C's designating their home as a licensed foster home, not
an adoptive home, and the irrevocability of the natural parents'
surrender of parental rights in favor of the Welfare Department.
Despite the obvious attachment present between the child and the
foster parents, the chancellor stated that he was "bound by the
law to uphold [both] agreements."131
The supreme court stated that the paramount concern was the
best interest of the child as reaffirmed in Bloodworth v.
Bloodworth."2 In applying this discretionary rule, the supreme
court looked beyond the contractual agreements between all of
the parties. The majority opinion rejected the chancery court's
127. 417 So. 2d 529, 531 (Miss. 1982).
128. Id. at 529.
129. Id. at 530.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 409 So. 2d 1336, 1337 (Miss. 1982).
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mutually exclusive classification of foster homes and prospective
adoption homes thereby reserving the opportunity for foster parents
to adopt the foster child as determined by this court on a case
by case basis.1" Further, the court looked to the emotional ties
that had grown between the C's and the minor child during the
first fifteen months of its life. Recognizing the need for stability
in the child's life, the court felt severing the relationship would
not be in the best interest of the child.
134
In a strongly worded dissent to the majority opinion in this
case, Justice Broome... reaffirmed his reliance to the contractual
obligations between parties stated in C. C. L and N. and Mrs.
N. v. Natural Parents as determinative of the rights and obliga-
tions of each party.
Prior to the placement of the minor child in the foster home
of the C's, a "Contract for Designation of Foster Home""3 was
executed and signed by the appellants. In so doing, the C's were
subject to the obligations and restrictions of that contract. As foster
parents they did not gain custody of the child, they waived any
right of custody in the child, and agreed not to attempt adoption
"unless the child is made free for adoption by written decision
and action of the State Department of Public Welfare."" 7 Com-
pliance with this contract and total cooperation with Welfare agen-
cy authorities was assumed by the foster parents. Finally, the C's
were compensated for their services of caring for the foster
children in their own home. Under this compensation agreement,
the foster parents contracted that they waived all their rights to
custody of the child and that they would not attempt to adopt the
child. 
13 8
The dissent held the contract to be totally binding to the C's.
Mississippi Code Annotated section § 43-15-5 (repealed 1981)
endows the state welfare agency with the power to organize and
administer an operative system for the placement of neglected
children in permanent adoptive homes. 3 The majority opinion's
failure to sustain the contract in this case is to negate the spirit
of the statutes. Repercussions from this ruling could undermine
133. J.C. v. Natural Parents, 417 So. 2d at 531.
134. Id.
135. C. C.L v. Natural Parents was a unanimous decision written by Justice Broom. However,
only Justices Sugg, Broom, and Patterson maintained this position in J. C. v. Natural Parents.
136. J.C. v. Natural Parents, 417 So. 2d at 532 (Broom, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 533.
138. Id. at 534.
139. Id. at 533.
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the orderly operation of all welfare department operations." '
Interpreting the "Contract for Designation of Foster Homes"
on pure contract principles, the dissenting justices found further
support for their view. The contract was entered into voluntarily
by the C's after they read and stated their understanding of its
terms.41' Valuable consideration was present to complete the offer-
acceptance-consideration trilogy necessary for a valid contract.
This contract was breached by the C's not only by attempting to
adopt the child, but also by a failure to cooperate with the Welfare
Department and the laws of Mississippi. To allow them the per-
manent custody of the child would be to reward the C's for their
unconscionable behavior.' 2
Expanding beyond contract law, Justice Broome found
definite facts to support the contract. There was no evidence ap-
parent to the foster parents that the child was free for adoption,
nor was there a written consent from the Scott County Welfare
Department stating that the child was free for adoption.' The
C's were aware that the child had been surrendered to the Welfare
Department pursuant to a surrender agreement. Citing C. C. L
v. Natural Parents, it appeared quite obvious to the dissent that
the surrender agreement between the natural parents and the
Welfare Department was irrevocable.' Therefore, the ir-
revocability of the surrender agreement and the denial of foster
parents rights to adopt the child clearly supported the contention
that the prospective parents, D.E.S. and J.A.S., should be entitl-
ed to the permanent custody of the child.
The dissenting justices also rejected the majority's affirmation
of the principle which states that the paramount concern of the
court is the best interest of the child. "' The foster parents bore
the burden of introducing this concept as an issue in the pro-
ceedings. There is no evidence that this was done. Even consider-
ing that the best interest of the child had been at issue, the C's
had failed to meet the high burden of proof. The foster parents
presented no evidence that the chancellor was not acting in the
best interest of the child.' 6
The opinion in J. C. v. Natural Parents ", has a dampening
140. Id. at 535.
141. Id. at 534.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 533.
144. Id. at 535.
145. Id. at 535-536.
146. Id.
147. 417 So. 2d 529 (Miss. 1982).
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effect on the contractual approach of the court towards adoption
proceedings. Although the dissent strongly reiterates the use of
contract principles, the unanimous opinion of all nine justices in
C. C. L v. Natural Parents'" has diminished to a minority of three
justices. The majority opinion of the court reaffirms their use of
judicial discretion in resolving disputes concerning the placement
of children by contract as opposed to one concrete rule of law.
C. C. L is still a compelling precedence. To lose sight of the most
important element in a custody controversy -that element being
the welfare of the child -is to destroy the court's own integrity
as parenspatriae and the child's one hope of receiving protection
from an impartial tribunal. The court now has its own interest
in the child's placement to protect and foster, along with that of
the two competing parties. Caught in this three way struggle, the
child loses. However, its rigid parameters have been relaxed to
include the prior principles of parental rights and the best interest
of the child.
Elizabeth Kerr Woodruff
148. 398 So. 2d 220 (Miss. 1981).
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